A bigger nation isn't always better - Kennedy

A bigger nation isn't always better

By Paul Kennedy

Friday, April 18, 2008

For thousands of years, historians and strategists have known that small but well-organized units of power can wield an influence out of all proportion to their actual size.

The perimeter walls of classical Athens were no measure at all of the extraordinary extent of the Greek presence, which ranged from Sicily to Egypt and northwards into the Black Sea. Many centuries later, Portugal, the Netherlands and Britain were geographical pygmies in terms of domestic acreage, though that did not stop them from placing their footprints on much of the rest of the globe from 1500 to 1900.

In today's world, Singapore, Hong Kong and Dubai punch well above their weight, again for historical and geopolitical reasons.

But if small does not predestine insignificant, perhaps larger doesn't always mean greater.

Consider the statistics in the next column about the size, population and arable acreage of the world's eight-largest political units.

If sheer geographic extent were the simple measure of relative world power, then Russia would bestride the world like a Colossus. But it does not. Its problem, to the contrary, is that it possesses too much land - the "Siberian curse" of having millions of square kilometers under permafrost.

In a reduced form, Canada suffers the same fate; you really can't live in much of that country. And, for the opposite climatological reasons, Australia has a similar "you-can't-live-in-most-of-it" character.

Still, in their inhabitable parts, both Canada and Australia can expect to enjoy steadily rising populations over the next half-century, as compared to Russia's terrifying demographic decline. The two former Dominions are large in extent, but constrained by geography to a modest demographic and political imprint. Russia is enormous, but greatly hamstrung by its size and its demographic implosion.

At the other end of the land and population spectrum, obviously, lie China and India. They are both sizeable entities, but amidst their great dusty plains, lengthy river basins and multiple mountain ranges reside well over 40 percent of the world's population, with India's total population (see chart) still rising at an alarming and probably unsustainable rate.

When the amount of usable arable land is added to this equation, the prospects for both Asian giants by mid-century do not look good. The blunt fact is that each of them would be stronger with only half their current populations. Here again, the three-legged stool has unevenly sized legs. It wobbles; it may tip over.

This leaves us, intriguingly, with the European Union, Brazil and the United States. It has always been difficult to assess the EU's relative geopolitical strengths (and weaknesses), whether it was the Original Six, or the later 18 or 23 nation-states. Additional members do not always mean additional power.

Some European countries are in serious demographic decline; a few are growing steadily. In terms of food supply, the area is generally self-sufficient, in some places in surplus. It is rich and cozy enough, and only some unforeseen future disaster or political folly could set it back greatly.

Brazil, it seems to me, is the "sleeper" here. Despite its horrendous urban and rural poverty, its tattered social fabric and its badly damaged environment, the general balance between its large geographic extent, its population size today and tomorrow, and the available arable land and water supplies, Brazil looks relatively healthy and sustainable.

Bad politics and lousy policies - of which Brazil has seen many during the 20th century - can of course change all that. But the country, viewed as a whole, looks naturally strong.

There remains the United States. As I have often pointed out, the U.S. has hurt itself in recent years through unwise and, well, plain stupid policies: excessive federal government deficits, neglect of its social and educational fabric, bureaucratic inefficiencies, unnecessary diplomatic arrogance, and the Manichean military pursuit of demons abroad.

It under-performs at home and over-performs across the globe. But if one sets all that aside - a big if - and looks simply at the size/population/food supply equation, America's relative position could not be cheerier.

Is the United States, then, in "relative decline"? Sure. The global economic balances (and, following them, the military-strategic balances of power) are shifting from the West to Asia; only a fool would deny that.

But is that decline also destined to be an absolute one, with America experiencing the sad decay that overcame, say, imperial Rome or Spain? I doubt it.

At any time, of course, a series of mistaken policies can badly damage the American republic. But its basic geopolitical configuration - protected by two oceans, flanked by only two, non-threatening states, and possessing the world's best balance between land size, population and agricultural output - gives it many strengths to help offset present and future stupidities.

Being very big, either in acreage or in populations, is of itself no guarantee of becoming and remaining a Great Power. But having large resources and a favorable geographical position, plus intelligent strategic managers, really can help you stay at the top for a very long time. Not forever, but longer than current policies will give you.

Paul Kennedy is professor of history and the director of international security studies at Yale University. He is currently writing a history of World War II. Distributed by Tribune Media Services.